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The Seveso Disaster Legacy  
Laura Centemeri 
 
1. Introduction 
In the history of the environment as a public problem, industrial disasters have been 
insufficiently explored.
1
 Such disasters are nonetheless crucial because their collective 
interpretation weaves technical and scientific issues with problems of social justice and 
controversies concerning conflicting “common goods”, by destabilizing the equilibria that 
has formed between these elements.
2
 These disequilibria open the way for episodes of 
normative and cognitive uncertainty, and thereby become windows of opportunity for 
social critique and social change, especially by opening public debates on rules, 
institutions, and representations about technical progress.  In short, industrial disasters 
become opportunities for rethinking the types of "compromise" between "orders of 
worth"—in particular industrial and civic--upon which a society rests.
3
 
 Yet there is still little acknowledgment of the social change that industrial disasters 
can trigger. What kind of social change industrial disasters produce in the mid- to long-
term, and how these disasters produce such changes, are questions that often go 
unaddressed.
4
 Moreover, an industrial disaster occurs in a specific locality even though its 
potential social and political effects can reach far beyond that locality. The environment 
affected by a disaster is usually limited and circumscribed, but as threat to the 
Environment--to Nature—the damages disasters can cause raise widespread concerns.
5
 
The collective explanation of the industrial accident, and of its specific character and 
narrative, takes place at different scales. The specific scale shouldn’t be considered simply 
a reflection of the researcher’s lens. Every scale implies a need to address a different stage 
of the disaster as event that requires different collective solutions. 
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 Starting from these premises, this chapter focuses on the local social dynamics 
triggered by the Seveso disaster:  how was the immediate town of Seveso affected in the 
long- term by this 1976 dioxin spill?
6
 This topic is usually overlooked in the literature 
devoted to the disaster, which to date has focused mostly on how this event led to stricter 
EU policies about environmental responsibility.
7
 Indeed, Seveso is considered a kind of 
symbol of European environmentalist struggle;  yet for Italy's own environmental 
movement, this event has overtones of defeat because of the failure to match the “general 
stakes” of the disaster with its “local sensibility”.
8
 As I aim to show here, this defeat has 
prompted local environmentalist strategies to change toward a “localist pathway”
9
 that 
sought in the 1990’s to recreate, at least partially, the composition that failed at the time of 
the accident.  
 After a concise reconstruction of the disaster dynamics, I shall focus on the local 
forms of mobilization in response to the crisis, pointing out the processes that support the 
prevailing interpretation of dioxin damage as a threat to the local culture and identity. I 
then turn to how this connection between environmental damage and local identity has 
been at the heart of the renewal of political action for a group of Seveso environmental 
activists, engaged in promoting local green policies and practices. By way of conclusion, I 
will then address the key role played by the construction of a shared memory of the 
disaster in an effort to promote more sustainable paths of local development. 
 
2. The Dioxin Crisis in Seveso and its Management 
Seveso is a town of 20.000 inhabitants located north of Milan, the regional capital of 
Lombardy, in the area known as Brianza Milanese. The Brianza is a subregion with a 
strong catholic cultural tradition, specializing in the manufacture and design of furniture, 
together with a tradition of small, family-owned firms.
10
 After World War Two, chemical 
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industries began to install their plants in this area, given the rich water resources and good 
infrastructure.     
 The accident at the origin of the Seveso disaster occurred in the chemical plant of 
the ICMESA company (located in the adjoining town of Meda), owned by Givaudan, a 
subsidiary of the Swiss multinational Roche. On Saturday July 10, 1976, at around 12:30 
a.m., the ICMESA trichlorophenol reactor released a toxic cloud of dioxin and other 
pollutants due to a sudden exothermic reaction that caused a failure of the safety valve. 
Various poisons were dispersed by wind to settle on buildings and backyards in the towns 
of Meda, Cesano Maderno, Desio, and the most heavily afflicted, Seveso.  
 As the Italian Parliamentary Commission on the Seveso Disaster has documented, 
the accident can be traced to Roche making inadequate safety investments in ICMESA 
plant.
11
 This negligence is made more serious when one realizes that the health risks of 
trichlorophenol were well known from previous industrial accidents. These risks revolve 
around the chemical produced in the process of synthesizing trichlorophenol: dioxin.  
 In 1976, the extremely harmful effects of dioxin on human health were predicted 
largely on the basis of toxicological evidence. Epidemiological studies with dioxin were 
still scarce and limited to tracking cohorts of industrial workers (all adult males) 
accidentally exposed to high concentrations of dioxin.
12
 Seveso's large-scale dioxin 
contamination affecting an entire population was without precedent: scientists were unable 
to anticipate the damages (on the environment, animals, men, women, children, and 
human fetuses) and unable to identify procedures for decontamination. There were no 
instruments yet available for measuring dioxin levels in human blood.
13
 As a result, there 
was a “radical uncertainty”
14
 in the consequences of dioxin contamination on human 
health and the environment, and in their duration in space and in time.  Only dioxin's 
extreme toxicity had been shown with laboratory proof. 
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 The frightening scenario didn’t take shape immediately after the accident. The 
toxic cloud passed by largely unnoticed, considered by inhabitants of Seveso and Meda as 
a typical nuisance (in a long series), though one that was perhaps a bit more annoying 
because of its nasty smell. Givaudan engineers reassured local authorities that everything 
was under control:
15
 the rest of production work continued normally in the ICMESA plant.  
A “week of silence” passed.
16
  In the meantime, strange events were taking place in the 
area near ICMESA: sudden falling of leaves; death of small animals such as birds and 
cats; a mysterious skin disease that affected children (chloracne).  Anxiety grew in the 
population and Roche's efforts failed to avoid a “desectorialisation of the crisis” on 
technical to political fronts.
17
 On July 19--nine days after the spill--Roche experts 
informed Italian authorities that the accident at the ICMESA plant had caused widespread 
dioxin contamination. Evacuation of part of Seveso's and Meda's population was highly 
recommended.  
 The evacuation began on July 24: 700 inhabitants of Seveso and Meda were forced 
to leave their houses and all their personal belongings. 200 people never returned to their 
houses that were eventually demolished during clean-up operations. “Risk zones”
 
were 
created, based on the estimated trajectory of the toxic cloud and random tests of dioxin 
concentration in the ground, but also based on practical feasibility, so that toxic 
boundaries turned out to be oddly rectilinear.
18
 Given the suspected teratogenic effects of 
dioxin, pregnant women of the contaminated area (within the third month of pregnancy) 
were given “free choice” to ask for a medical abortion, even if abortion was still 
considered a crime in Italy. In fact, the Italian movement for decriminalizing abortion was 
at its peak.
19
 In an emotionally-packed atmosphere, about thirty women from the 
contaminated area decided to voluntarily interrupt their pregnancies.
20
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 The Lombardy regional authorities management of the dioxin crisis was marked 
by bureaucracy and technical dependency.
21
 Committees of experts were created and 
asked to supply solutions with respect to health risk, decontamination, and socio-
economic problems. Each committee was required to give its advice unanimously so that 
the only thing the Regional Council had to do was to approve them, and no discussion on 
alternative technical choices was allowed. Decisions of a true political nature were 
therefore taken inside the committees, meaning that these were not just advisory 
committees. Likewise, a special technical body was created (The Seveso Special Bureau) 
in order to implement the adopted measures.  Lastly, government stability at regional and 
national levels was a priority, thereby narrowing the windows of opportunity for 
institutional change opened by the crisis.
22
  In the end, there was little visibility in the 
decision making process, which offered few opportunities for input from ordinary citizens, 
even if such decisions strongly affected their everyday life.  
 Given the enormous scientific uncertainty surrounding dioxin, it was clear to 
everyone that most decisions taken at Seveso could not rely on much objectivity.  
Nevertheless, scientific controversies about dioxin hazards were widely discussed in the 
media. The insistence by public authorities that decision criteria were purely scientific and 
technical, followed by a period of erratic and contradictory decision-making,  convinced 
the public that dioxin was mainly a false scare and political trick. Allowing abortions 
despite uncertainties about the risk to fetuses was considered to be evidence of the 
manipulation of the crisis. 
 Abortion became the central issue in the public debate, so that more general health 
issues surrounding dioxin, including risks from pollution damages, slipped into the 
background.  The dioxin catastrophe became a question of “allowing women to abort or 
not,” and not about the hidden costs of industrialisation.
23
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Considered from the perspective of government-citizen dialogue, management of the 
dioxin crisis in Seveso was a good example of a bad way to handle a chemical emergency. 
Environmental recovery was nonetheless successful, with a complete clean-up of the 
contaminated area with little transformation of the local socio-economic fabric.
24
  
 
3. From Disaster to Cultural Conflict: Rival Interpretations of the Dioxin Crisis 
In Europe, the dioxin crisis at Seveso marked the appearance of a new kind of 
environmental damage: one that might produce delayed rather than immediate effects. 
Damaging chemical effects might extend to future generations.
25
 The specificities of the 
damage and the supranational features of the disaster accelerated the process of assigning 
environmental responsibility to the European Union, an issue that was not envisioned in 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The Seveso disaster was especially influential in establishing 
the category of “major accident hazards of certain industrial activities” regulated through 
Directive 82/501/CEE (or “Seveso Directive"). In its design, this 1982 Directive echoed 
some of the issues brought out by the Seveso disaster and, in particular, the crucial role 
played by information in risk management.
26
 The Seveso disaster is widely interpreted as 
an “information disaster,” given the secrecy of what was happening inside ICMESA:  
public authorities had insufficient information for intervening in a timely manner.  At the 
local level, too, the lack of information was crucial, especially because there was little 
information generated by citizens for use in making public decisions. 
 Social movements already active in the Italian political scene along with several 
left-wing political parties mobilised in Seveso. One result was the establishment of a 
“Scientific Technical Popular Committee” (STPC) for looking after the interests of the 
victims. One of the most important actors in this mobilisation was Medicina Democratica 
(MD), a movement which arose out of a large coalition between scientists and workers for 
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lobbying issues related to health damages stemming from industrial production, within 
and beyond plants.
27
 Underlying this agenda was a social critique of capitalistic 
exploitation and its hidden costs.  But this frame found little to no reception among Seveso 
victims, thus reducing the weight of MD's public arguments and, more generally, its 
influence at the national level.
28
 How does one explain this failure? 
 The leftist activists upheld the Seveso disaster as a typical “capitalistic crime,” as a 
clear example of the capitalist system of injustice.
29
 Seveso people were asked to join an 
existing cause, that of the class struggle. In the way leftists were framing the crisis people 
from Seveso could exist in the public space only as victims of irreparable damage. In this 
respect, leftist activists were as incapable as public authorities in comprehending what 
Seveso people considered to be the priority in responding to the dioxin crisis:  preserving 
their town as a specific community. Neither public authorities nor radical leftists, given 
their interpretative frames, were able to account for this dimension of “attachment”
30
 to 
place and community.  
 Appealing to the scientific uncertainties of dioxin risk, there emerged a grassroots 
mobilization of people from a strong catholic background. They asked public authorities 
to consider not only the seriousness of health risks but that of their community's uprooting 
as well. Yet no arenas to publicly discuss and mediate these issues were opened, causing 
intense grassroots protest.     
 In this protest a central role was assumed by activists of the catholic movement 
called “Comunione e Liberazione” (CL)
31
. For CL, the disaster was not a crime but a 
“test” for the community. They felt themselves under attack as a community, and needing 
to stick to their values, territory, and tradition as response. CL asked public authorities to 
recognize the community right to actively be part of the response to the dioxin crisis, 
appealing to the subsidiary principle.  In actual fact, CL activists organised their own 
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services for supporting families harmed by the disaster, and tried to maintain a 
communitarian spirit based on shared values such as religion and family. The harm done 
by dioxin was thus seen as damage to a community and not to individuals. From this 
perspective, the return to good community life was considered the best indication of 
recovery from the dioxin horror, beyond the actual clean-up of contaminated areas. This 
idea of dioxin damage as a community threat parallels the idea of recovery based on 
privatising the disaster's controversial implications, in particular, its future health effects.  
Such health damages are left to individuals to bear alone. In the collective effort to "resist 
and move on," the problematic issues revealed by the event (especially as measured by 
ongoing chemical pollution of the territory) seemed to be erased.  
 
4. A Come Back to Seveso: Activist Trajectories 
After the accident, only a small number of inhabitants chose to leave Seveso, among them, 
a small group of young Seveso activists who had participated in the mobilisation 
promoted by the STPC. The accident had pushed them into political action, yet the 
reaction of most Seveso people made them believe that “in Seveso it was not possible to 
carry on the struggle necessary to change the institutional system so as to avoid repeating 
a similar accident” (Interview LB).  
 In fact, from the perspective of the political ecology of STPC, industrial damage of 
the environment was proof that the capitalist system needed radical changing. Concern for 
nature or territory was of dubious validity because such issues were a matter of “bourgeois 
conservationism”.
32
 Needing to face conflicts stirred up by the disaster in the people of 
Seveso, these young activists lacked a vocabulary capable of translating into political 
issues the attachment to place that their fellow citizens claimed to be a “common good” 
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needing protection. Indeed, their political culture condemned this very attachment as an 
obstacle to join the general cause of the class struggle.   
During the 1980s, these young activists embraced new political agendas, in particular, 
international cooperation and feminism. These political experiences shared the belief that 
practice was a form of political engagement.  
 At the beginning of the 1990s, the group of activists returned to Seveso with a new 
political project, that of making the experience of the disaster a basis for social and 
economic change toward green values, produced within the local community. Since the 
time of the accident, and thanks to their recent political experiences, their previous way of 
conceiving political action on environmental issues had changed dramatically, largely 
because of feminist influences.
33
 The emphasis that Italian feminism puts on the “practice 
of relationships” as a form of “primary political action” led to a redefinition of the very 
terms of the issue of environment, far from the frameworks of both political and 
conservationist ecology.
34
 The idea here is that of taking care of a concrete and local 
environment through practices that give birth to new relationships between human beings, 
and between human beings and their environment. The emphasis is no longer on the 
concept of political duty, nor on the abstract concept of the right action to be taken as a 
guide for political engagement. Political action must be rooted and must take shape in 
everyday life practices that are political per se, because they build and change contexts 
through changing relationships.  
 One of the Seveso activists described this change in focus of political action, and 
the need for change, as follows:  
At the time of the accident, we were unable to understand 
the importance of the “practical” dimension. We launched 
into an ideological extrapolation of the environmental 
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question in order to fight a global struggle. We didn’t 
consider, or didn’t consider enough, the vital interests 
linked to everyday life, that were affected by the dioxin 
event. This is the reason why we did not succeed in our 
attempt to interact with the people. This is the reason why I 
decided to leave Seveso, because my political action at that 
time was intended to change a lot of things: it was not 
enough for me to change a small aspect of living in my 
neighbourhood. But after a few years, I began to see my 
political action as rootless. There was a sort of gap: my 
political action was becoming more and more universal, but 
every time I came back to Seveso I had less and less to 
share with the people living there (Interview MM). 
The new political attitude of the group became consolidated through a series of local 
experiences of new political engagement. First of all, the creation in Seveso of a local 
section of Legambiente, named after Laura Conti, one of the preeminent figures in the 
STPC, and a communist, environmentalist, and feminist activist.
35
 Then in 1991-1992, the 
group became engaged in restoring a small wooded area in Seveso, “Fosso del 
Ronchetto,” which was being used as a waste dump. The “Fosso del Ronchetto” 
experience was a turning point. Legambiente activists made themselves visible in the eyes 
of the local community; the restoration project provided the opportunity for meeting 
citizens and getting them interested in Legambiente activities. At the same time, the 
activists established a new kind of relationship with local institutions: they assumed a 
direct and formal responsibility in doing things for the community, an attitude far from 
their former critical and conflictual logic of action. In fact, the town council gave the local 
  
243 
Legambiente section formal responsibility for the recovery and management of the wood. 
From this point, the Legambiente activists gave birth in 1995 to Natur&, a “social 
enterprise” meant to offer “innovative environmental and social services” (Statue of the 
Natur& Association, art 4). This choice marked the shift of Legambiente activists toward 
a model of “localist and access organizations”
36
 very similar to that of some of the 
organizations linked to the CL movement.  
 Direct action in the local context, through supplying services, is considered by 
activists as just one of the ways to promote a greener model of economic development. 
Direct involvement in the local political arena is the other. In 1996 the group of activists 
turned to the local political arena, as a local branch of the national Green Party. But in 
1999 the group left the Greens and contributed to the creation of a “civic list” not directly 
linked to any national political party in order to support a candidate for the election of the 
town mayor; this candidate was a bridging figure, strongly linked to the catholic 
movement CL but also to local environmentalism. The civic list won the elections and one 
of the activists was put in charge of the municipality's social and environmental policies. 
One of his first decisions had been to promote an Agenda 21 process together with the 
other municipalities involved in the accident of 1976 (Cesano Maderno, Desio, Meda). In 
Agenda 21, the work on the collective memory of the disaster is explicitly promoted as a 
milestone in the local change toward a more sustainable model of development. These 
developments are why, in 2002, the Agenda 21 process sponsored the project “Seveso 
Bridge of Memory,” which was promoted and realised by the Seveso section of 
Legambiente.  
 
5. The Construction of “Discreet” Memory 
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The issue of the memory of the ICMESA accident is especially linked to one place, “The 
Oak Wood,” a 42-hectare plot of forest in the urban center of Seveso that was artificially 
created over the most contaminated area, site of two subterranean dumps filled with the 
toxic wastes produced during the decontamination procedures.  In 1996, the wood was 
opened to the public without any kind of “memory inscription”
37
 testifying to its origin. 
Legambiente activists highly criticized this kind of “indiscriminate opening”: 
We never agreed with the choice of an indiscriminate opening of 
the park, composed of folkloristic and purely recreational events. 
Instead, we proposed since 1996 to make it a space of 
environmental education for preserving and safeguarding the 
memory of the disaster. The idea that one could forget what was 
hidden under its soil, and perhaps even build houses on it, has 
always been greatly disturbing for us (Interview GB). 
The “Seveso Bridge of Memory” project was developed in 1999-2000 by these activists as 
a way to oppose what seemed to be a sort of collective pressure to erase the disaster's 
memory, starting from the normalization of the Oak Wood. They then asked local town 
councils to finance the creation of an archive of the disaster as well as a “memory 
footpath” in the Oak Wood complete with displays telling the accident's story through 
texts and photos.  
 Given the aim of defining a commonly shared memory of the event, the texts and 
photos were written and chosen by Legambiente activists together with an oversight 
committee composed of 10 people from Seveso. These people were considered 
representative of the different walks of life of the local community and uninvolved in 
politics or public institutions at the time of the accident. Once the displays were created, 
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they were presented to the larger community of Seveso for further opinions and 
suggestions.  
 The process that led to the opening of the “memory footpath” in 2004 showed how 
Legambiente activists aimed to place the IMCESA event at the center of a new collective 
identity of the Seveso community. The inscriptions on the displays fixes the ICMESA 
accident as a test for the local community, successfully overcome. According to one of the 
project's organizers, the inhabitants of Seveso now acknowledge the importance of what 
happened in more general issues--such as sustainability--in order to make better future 
decisions. The dioxin incident is therefore considered a tragedy as well as an “opportunity 
for change”:  the attachment to place shown by Seveso inhabitants at the time of the 
accident could now be the starting point for promoting a green model of local 
development (Interview MM). Thus, the people of Seveso can “positively” identify 
themselves with the ICMESA event, confirming that this was not merely a painful tragedy 
but also a moment in which the community recognized the value of its attachment to the 
land, making it an active instrument of change.  The Oak Woods is celebrated as a victory, 
a symbol of a community rooted in the territory and of an environmentalism dependent on 
this same attachment to the land, thereby opening it to broader issues of sustainability.  
 Yet this process of “memory building” has also made it evident that conflicts 
continue in the community, and that even today it is rather difficult to speak publicly 
about what happened in 1976--especially concerning compensations, abortions, and health 
effects.  In the words of one of the committee members: 
The memory we are writing here must be a discreet memory, 
respectful of personal suffering. In this process, we must try to 
avoid reopening old wounds, avoid forcing people to confront 
painful or sorrowful things they want to forget. We must avoid 
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the nihilism that assumes recovery from this damage is 
impossible, stressing instead the resilience of civic community.  
From this perspective, one of the main problems that the Seveso disaster made collectively 
obvious is that health and environmental damages stemming from chemical plants in 
Brianza have never been adequately addressed or compensated, either politically or 
symbolically.  In spite of that, the health and environmental aftermath of industrial 
pollution is a question that the local community does not wish to address, today as 
yesterday.  
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